Forgiveness as the Unconditional Rejection of Vengeance

Abstract

Drawing on the work of Joseph Butler and Reinhold Niebuhr, this thesis presents and defends the idea that forgiveness involves only the unconditional rejection of vengeance, not other actions normally associated with forgiveness (such as relational reconciliation and nonretaliation). Forgiveness involves the rejection of revenge as a motivation for action and the response to injury should be to prevent or remedy it. The secondary literature about Butler is investigated to determine what of it is accurate and inaccurate and implications for Butler’s forgiveness are indicated. In order to bolster this concept of forgiveness, three strong challenges to Butlerian forgiveness are addressed. The one is that forgiveness is or should be regarded as a good thing at all (John Kekes), that vengeance can sometimes be a good thing (Jeffrie Murphy), and that forgiveness is supererogatory (Cheshire Calhoun). It is argued against them that they often define forgiveness unnecessarily broadly, that vengeance is irrational, and that the concept of retribution is based on flawed or vague principles. Finally, Butlerian forgiveness is applied to a practical problem (just war and self-defence). In so doing, John Howard Yoder’s pacifism is addressed as it presents an influential objection to the interpretation of Christian forgiveness presented by Butler and Niebuhr (which allows for war).