Are Bare Particulars Constituents?
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Issue Date
2013
Authors
Davis, Richard Brian, 1963-
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Article
Keywords
Bare particulars
Constituent ontology
Relations
Property instances
Moreland, James Porter, 1948-
Constituent ontology
Relations
Property instances
Moreland, James Porter, 1948-
Citation
Davis, Richard Brian. “Are Bare Particulars Constituents?” Acta Analytica 28, no. 4 (2013): 395-410. DOI: 10.1007/s12136-012-0178-9
Abstract
In this article I examine an as yet unexplored aspect of J.P. Moreland’s defense of so-called bare particularism — the ontological theory according to which ordinary concrete particulars (e.g., Socrates) contain bare particulars as individuating constituents and property ‘hubs.’ I begin with the observation that
if there is a constituency relation obtaining between Socrates and his bare particular, it must be an internal relation, in which case the natures of the relata will necessitate the relation. I then distinguish various ways in which a bare particular might be thought to have a nature and show that on none of these is it possible for a bare particular to be a constituent of a complex particular. Thus, Moreland’s attempt to resurrect bare particulars as ontologically indispensable entities is not wholly without difficulties.
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Springer
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