Layman’s Lapse: On an Incomplete Moral Argument for Theism
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Issue Date
2013
Authors
Davis, Richard Brian, 1963-
Franks, W. Paul
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Artist
Creator
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Photographer
Type
Article
Keywords
Layman, C. Stephen (Charles Stephen), 1950-
Theism
God
Naturalism
Life after death
Theism
God
Naturalism
Life after death
Citation
Accepted Manuscript (AM) Citation: Davis, Richard Brian and W. Paul Franks. “Layman’s Lapse: On an Incomplete Moral Argument for Theism.” Philo: A Journal of Philosophy 16, no. 2 (Fall/Winter 2013): 170-179.
Abstract
C. Stephen Layman contends that an argument supporting theism over naturalism can be constructed based on three defensible, non–question-begging premises about the moral order. Previous critics of Layman’s argument have challenged the truth of these premises. We stipulate
them arguendo but go on to show that there is a deeper problem: a fourth premise introduced to complete the argument—the “completion premise,” as we call it—is true only if we assume that God exists (begging the question about naturalism) or we concede that there is no afterlife
(contrary to theism). We close with suggestions for how Layman’s argument must be strengthened to meet with dialectical success.
Table of Contents
Publisher
Philosophy Documentation Center
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Copyright, Philosophy Documentation Center. All rights reserved.
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Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International License
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https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/