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Was C.S. Lewis a Rational Determinist?

dc.rights.licenseAttribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International Licenseen_US
dc.contributor.authorDavis, Richard Brian, 1963-
dc.date.accessioned2023-03-21T13:49:26Z
dc.date.available2023-03-21T13:49:26Z
dc.date.copyright2022-10
dc.date.issued2022-10
dc.identifier.citationDavis, Richard Brian. “Was C.S. Lewis a Rational Determinist?” Journal of Inklings Studies 12, no. 2 (October 2022): 227-236.en_US
dc.identifier.issn2045-8797en_US
dc.identifier.urihttps://digitalcollections.tyndale.ca/handle/20.500.12730/2346
dc.description.abstractIn his recently published book C. S. Lewis (Wiley-Blackwell, 2018), Stewart Goetz argues that C.S. Lewis endorsed a form of rational determinism, according to which we are causally determined to draw the conclusions we do. Our inferences are not within our control; they happen to us whether we like it or not. If Goetz is right, then incredibly we must say that reasoning is not something Lewis ever did. I shall attempt to show that (taken in context) the texts to which Goetz appeals fail to support his thesis. In fact, upon closer analysis, they indicate precisely the opposite: Lewis was no rational determinist.en_US
dc.description.urihttps://www.euppublishing.com/doi/epub/10.3366/ink.2022.0155en_US
dc.format.mediumOnlineen_US
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdf/uaen_US
dc.language.isoenen_US
dc.publisherEdinburgh University Pressen_US
dc.rightsCopyright, Edinburgh University Press. All rights reserved.en_US
dc.rights.urihttps://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/en_US
dc.subject.lcshLewis, C. S. (Clive Staples), 1898-1963en_US
dc.subject.lcshNaturalismen_US
dc.subject.lcshCausationen_US
dc.titleWas C.S. Lewis a Rational Determinist?en_US
dc.typeArticleen_US
dc.contributor.affiliationTyndale Universityen_US
dc.contributor.departmentDepartment of Philosophyen_US
dc.contributor.repositoryTyndale University, J. William Horsey Library, 3377 Bayview Ave., Toronto, ON, M2M 3S4, Canada. Contact: repository@tyndale.caen_US
dc.identifier.bibrecordhttps://tyndale.on.worldcat.org/oclc/1006652657en_US
dc.identifier.issueno. 2en_US
dc.identifier.journalJournal of Inklings Studiesen_US
dc.identifier.orcidhttps://orcid.org/0000-0003-4608-6172en_US
dc.identifier.volume12en_US
dc.publisher.placeEdinburghen_US
dc.rights.holderhttps://www.euppublishing.com/customer-services/authors/permissionsen_US
dc.subject.keywordLewis, C. S. (Clive Staples), 1898-1963en_US
dc.subject.keywordRational determinismen_US
dc.subject.keywordMiraclesen_US
dc.subject.keywordNaturalismen_US
dc.subject.keywordInferenceen_US
dc.subject.keywordCausalityen_US
dc.description.chapterpage227-236en_US
dc.description.noteWaiting for publisher’s permission to upload this article to the TDC repository.en_US
dc.description.noteFor AODA accommodation, including help with reading this content, please contact repository@tyndale.caen_US


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  • Davis, Richard B.
    Dr. Richard B. Davis is Professor of Philosophy and Chair, Department of Philosophy at Tyndale University.

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