Davis, Richard Brian. “God and Counterpossibles.” Religious Studies 42, no. 4 (2006): 371-391. DOI: 10.1017/S0034412506008559
In this paper I critically examine Brian Leftow’s attempt to construct a theistic semantics for counterpossibles, one that can be used to make sense of the fact that propositions, which exist necessarily, nevertheless depend on God as their
cause. I argue that the impressive theoretical framework erected by Leftow cannot guarantee an asymmetrical dependence of propositions on God, and ultimately leads to a semantic collapse in which every counterpossible comes out false. I end by defending an alternative account of God and propositions – what I call ‘theistic existentialism’. It is shown how this account underwrites a semantics for
counterpossibles that conveniently avoids the problems attending Leftow’s theory.
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